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An Empirical Investigation of IPO Earnings Forecasts in China 
Abstract 
This study empirically examines the reliability of earnings forecast information 
disclosed in prospectuses of initial public offerings (IPOs ) in China. Prior studies on 
the IPO forecast reliability focus on the use of data in the British Commonwealth 
countries. The relative reliability of Chinese IPO earnings forecasts to other 
countries' is first examined. One aim of the new regulation. Announcement of Some 
Rules on the Issuance of Shares promulgated by the CSRC, is to reduce IPO forecast 
errors. The study empirically assesses the efficacy of this policy change for the 
improvement of forecast reliability. The evidences show that the new regulation 
began to be efficient to mitigate the overestimation of IPO earnings forecast. 
However, the regulation can not improve the forecast accuracy. The avoidance of 
significant forecast errors may motivate managers to manipulate reported earnings 
toward predicted earnings. In China, it seems that the ex-ante managerial behavior 
for IPO earnings forecasts is to estimate earnings optimistically, whereas the ex-post 
managerial behavior is to manage earnings to mitigate the overestimation. This study 
presents the evidences that managers execute transactions involving below-the-line 
items to reduce EPO forecast errors in China. The association between the IPO 
forecast accuracy and firm characteristics in the Chinese context is also examined in 
the study in order to help investors to establish a set of objective criteria for the 
evaluation of forecast reliability. The study suggests that forecast horizon and past 
earnings variability are significantly positively related to the forecast errors, whereas 




















Management earnings forecasts disclosed in prospectuses for initial public 
offerings ( IPOs ) can provide useful information about the firm's future economic 
prospects to the prospective investors and assist them to evaluate the future 
performance of firms for their good investment decision making. At the time of 
initial public offerings, there is a lack of publicly available information on the firm, 
therefore, earnings forecasts disclosed in IPO prospectuses may be potentially more 
important to investors than management earnings forecasts made by firms which have 
been listed for some time. IPOs are particularly vulnerable to information asymmetry 
problems because entrepreneurs / managers know future earnings prospects better 
than other potential investors in the projects ( Leland and Pyle 1977 ). Entrepreneurs 
can not be expected to be entirely straightforward about their projects, since there may 
be substantial rewards for exaggerating positive qualities. For example, an owner-
manager might overestimate earnings forecasts in an attempt to raise more proceeds 
from the initial public offering. Therefore, the moral hazard problem hampers the 
direct transfer of information between entrepreneurs / managers and potential 
investors and then weakens the reliability of management earnings forecasts contained 
in IPO prospectuses ( Bhattacharya 1979 and 1980 ). However, the reduction in the 
reliability of earnings forecasts arising from information asymmetry can be mitigated 
by the implementation of mechanisms to control moral hazard ( McConomy 1998 ) 
and be offset by the manipulation of reported earnings ( Kasznik 1999 ). Naturally, 
the reliability of IPO earnings forecasts is a topic of general interest to researchers, 
investors, and regulators. 
US studies of the reliability of management earnings forecasts have begun 
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since the early 1970s, however, IPO earnings forecasts are scarcely addressed in these 
studies because earnings forecasts are rarely disclosed in US IPO prospectuses 
(Cameron 1982 ). The dearth of forecast data in the US context demonstrates the 
importance of the study of IPO earnings forecasts based on the other contexts. Prior 
researches on IPO earnings forecasts are concentrated on the reliability of IPO earning 
forecasts and its relationship to firm characteristics in the contexts of British 
Commonwealth countries ( Jelic, Saadouni and Briston 1998 ). The reliability of IPO 
earnings forecasts varies significantly across different countries and the mixed results 
can not be generalized in a different context. Less studies of forecast reliability have 
been conducted in the emerging markets, especially in China. Also, the effects of IPO 
regulation change on the reliability of IPO earnings forecasts are rarely discussed in 
the literature. The relative reliability of Chinese IPO earnings forecasts to other 
countries' is first examined in the study. Chinese IPO forecast accuracy is higher 
relative to many British Commonwealth countries. This study examines whether a 
new Chinese IPO regulation that aims to mitigate moral hazard can improve the 
reliability of earnings forecasts disclosed in Chinese prospectuses of the initial public 
offerings. The evidences suggest that the new regulation begins to be efficient in the 
reduction of overestimation because some listed firms and their auditors are punished 
according to the regulation since 1997. However, no significant improvement in 
forecast accuracy is found in the study. 
A significant overestimation of earnings forecasts may be viewed as 
undesirable because it is typically associated with a loss of firm and management 
reputation, a loss of confidence and credibility in the firm, an adverse market reaction, 
and a potential legal liability, etc. Management may have an incentive to increase the 
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actual earnings so that the overestimated forecast error could be reduced. On the other 
hand, management may have little motivation to increase or reduce the actual 
earnings when earnings forecasts are underestimated. There are only three published 
studies involved in the relationship between the reliability of management earnings 
forecasts and earnings management in the literature. Management are motivated to 
adopt discretionary accounting changes ( Jaggi and Sannella 1995 ) and use 
discretionary accruals ( Kasznik 1999 ) to improve the reliability of non-IPO earnings 
forecasts in US, however, managers did not utilize accounting adjustments to reduce 
IPO forecast errors in UK ( Ferris 1976 ). Previous studies suggest that managers 
manipulate earnings in the financial statements included in prospectuses to increase 
IPO proceeds. The study will investigate the association between earnings 
management and forecast errors for the IPO year. The prevalent disclosure of 
forecasted income statements in Chinese IPO prospectuses since 1996 encourages me 
to examine if managers execute transactions involving below-the-line items to reduce 
the overestimation of IPO earnings forecasts in this study. ‘ I find that managers are 
motivated to manipulate the below-the-line items to avoid the significant forecast 
errors. It is suggested that the ex-ante managerial behavior for IPO earnings forecasts 
is to optimistically estimate earnings, whereas the ex-post managerial behavior is to 
manage reported earnings toward the forecast in order to reduce the overestimation. 
The main topic of prior researches on IPO forecast reliability is to determine 
the possible firm characteristics affecting the accuracy of IPO earnings forecasts. The 
evidences on the determinants of IPO forecast accuracy are mixed from one context to 
another. For example, the length of the forecast period, the age of the firm, the firm's 
public accountant, and the firm's industry are significantly associated with the 
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accuracy of earnings forecasts contained in Canadian IPO prospectuses ( Pedwell, 
Warsame and Neu 1994 ). However, only the forecast interval was observed to be 
significantly correlated with the IPO earnings forecast accuracy in Australia ( Hartnett 
1993 ). This study includes a continuation of previous research efforts to search for 
some possible determinants of IPO forecast accuracy in the Chinese context. This 
would help to establish a set of objective criteria to evaluate the reliability of earnings 
forecasts made in the Chinese IPO prospectuses. The evidences show that forecast 
horizon and past earnings variability are positively significantly related to forecast 
accuracy, whereas the rate of retained equity is negatively significantly associated 
with forecast accuracy in China. 
The reminder of the thesis is organized as follows. The second section reviews 
the relevant studies in the literature. The third section discusses the institutional 
background on IPO earnings forecasts in China. The fourth section compares the 
forecast reliability of Chinese IPOs with that in other countries and empirically 
assesses the efficacy of a new regulation. The association between forecast errors and 
the manipulation of the below-the-line items is examined in the fifth section. The 
sixth section identifies the determinants of forecast accuracy, and the last section 
provides the conclusions and implications. 
2. Literature review 
Since the early 1970s, quite a large number of studies have been done that 
purport to measure the accuracy of non-IPO earnings forecasts in US. These studies 
investigated the accuracy of management earnings forecasts and, in some cases, 
attempted to establish a correlation between accuracy and a series of independent 
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variables. For example, McDonald ( 1973 ) studied management's earnings-per-share 
forecasts obtained from the Wall Street Journal for the five-year period from 1966 to 
1970 and found that management overforecast earnings by an average of 13.6 percent. 
Imhoff ( 1978 ) replicated the McDonald's study for the years 1971 to 1974, and he 
found that the mean forecast error was 1.07 percent over actual earnings, but the mean 
absolute error was 16.1 percent. For firms in the chemical and service subgroups, 
management earnings forecasts can be expected to be more accurate, however, no 
inference could be draw with regard to the impact of firm size on the comparative 
accuracy of earnings forecasts ( Jaggi 1980 ). The main conclusions of the Porter 
( 1982 ) study were: (1) earnings variability was negatively related to forecast 
accuracy, (2) utilities provided more accurate forecasts, and (3) year of forecast was 
related to forecast accuracy. 
The first empirical study of IPO earnings forecast reliability was conducted by 
Dev and Webb ( 1972 ) using forecast data contained in UK prospectuses. Their 
findings reveal an underestimation of forecasts and a significant positive relationship 
between the forecast horizon and the forecast error. Ferris and Hayes ( 1977 ), and 
Keasey and McGuinness ( 1991 ) also examine the accuracy of earnings forecasts 
included in IPO prospectuses in the UK context. No significant association between 
forecast error and accuracy determinants was reported in the Ferris and Hayes's study. 
Keasey and McGuinness ( 1991 ) found that forecast earnings are underestimated by 5 
percent and have a mean absolute error of 11 percent, and also the forecast horizon 
and the floating cost are significantly correlated with the forecast accuracy. In 
Canada, significant relationships between forecast accuracy and audit quality, forecast 
horizon, firm size, and variability of the underlying conditions faced by the 
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company's industry, were reported ( Davidson and Neu 1993 ). Pedwell, Warsame 
and Neu ( 1994 ) presented the evidences that earnings forecasts are overestimated by 
77.7 percent and the mean forecast accuracy are 88 percent using the data from 1983 
to 1987, and forecast accuracy is significantly related to forecast horizon, audit 
quality, company age and change in specific industry index. Additionally, McConomy 
(1998 ) found that the mean overestimated bias of forecasts for the years of 1983 to 
1994 is 45.2 percent and the optimistic bias can be reduced by a 1989 regulation that 
required the forecasts to be audited by the public accountants, but there is only a 
marginally significant improvement in accuracy. 
The accuracy of Australian forecasts have been examined by Lee and Yee 
(1993 ) on a sample of 98 IPOs from 1976 to 1989. Their findings indicated that the 
forecasts were overly optimistic, with the mean forecast error of 994.4 percent, and 
the mean absolute error was as high as 1138.2 percent. Only forecast horizon was 
significantly associated with forecast accuracy. In another Australian study, Hartnett 
(1993 ) also found that forecast errors were significantly related to forecast horizon. 
In New Zealand, Mak ( 1989 ) reported that the mean of absolute forecast error based 
on 111 forecasts for the period 1983-1987 was 100 percent and the three significant 
determinants of forecast accuracy were forecast horizon, firm's age and change in 
economic conditions. Firth and Smith ( 1992 ) examined the accuracy of 89 forecasts 
disclosed in New Zealand's IPO prospectuses from 1983 to 1986. Their findings 
indicated that there were an optimistic mean bias of 92 percent and a mean absolute 
error of 328 percent for these IPOs, and only firm size was significantly correlated 
with forecast accuracy. 
Three studies of forecast accuracy for Singapore IPOs were conducted, and the 
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first study was based on 51 IPOs issued from 1972 to 1984 ( Tan 1987 ). Its findings 
indicated that earnings forecasts were underestimated by 24 percent. Lam and Chang 
(1994 ) found that the forecast error was not influenced by the company's auditors in 
Singapore. Firth, Kwok, Liau-Tan and Yeo ( 1995 ) re-examined the accuracy of 
profit forecasts contained in 104 IPOs issued by Singapore companies from 1980 to 
1993. They reported that the mean of underestimated error was 20.11 percent, and the 
mean forecast accuracy was 10.4 percent. Firm size and forecast horizon were found 
to be significantly associated with forecast accuracy in their study. In Hong Kong, the 
mean of absolute forecast error for 110 IPOs during the years 1990-1992 was 18 
percent and the two significant factor affecting forecast accuracy were change in 
economic conditions and past profit variability ( Chan, Sit, Tong, Wong and Chan 
1996 ). Jaggi ( 1997 ) examined the reliability of earnings forecasts disclosed in 161 
Hong Kong's IPO prospectuses issued from 1990 to 1994, and found a forecast 
underestimation of 6.5 percent and a mean forecast accuracy of 12.79 percent. The 
evidences in his study showed that there was a significant association between 
forecast accuracy and firm age. A research on the forecast accuracy of 65 Malaysian 
IPOs during the period from 1975 to 1988 indicated that predicted earnings were 
underestimated by 9.34 and the mean of absolute forecast error was 27.91 percent 
(Mohamad, Nassir, Kuing and Ariff 1994 ). A recent study of forecast reliability 
using 124 IPO earnings forecasts for the years of 1984-1995 in Malaysia was 
conducted by Jelic, Saadouni and Briston ( 1998 ). Forecasts were underestimated by 
a mean bias of 33.37 percent, and the mean absolute bias was 54.91 percent. Their 
findings revealed that both the firm age and the industry classification were 
significantly associated with the forecast accuracy. 
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Managers may engage in earnings management for a variety of motivations. 
For example, Healy ( 1985 ) suggested that managers would opportunistically manage 
net income so as to maximize their bonuses. Income-increasing accounting changes 
are employed to reduce the probability of technical default ( Sweeney 1994 ). Cahan 
(1992 ) found that income-decreasing accounting polices were adopted to mitigate 
the political visibility. Managers have an incentive to manipulate earnings for their 
job security ( DeFond and Park 1997 ). Burgstahler and Dichev ( 1997 ) presented the 
evidences that firms manage reported earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses. 
The study conducted by Aharony, Lin and Loeb ( 1993 ) predicts that entrepreneurs 
can systematically select accounting methods to increase reported earnings in the 
periods prior to going public. They found only very weak support for the prediction. 
However, Friedlan ( 1994 ) reports the significant evidence that issuers of IPOs make 
income-increasing discretionary accruals before going public. Especially, the 
evidence of upward earnings management and highest median return on asset for 
Chinese IPOs is also found by Aharony, Lee and Wong ( 1997 ). Recently, Teoh, 
Welch and Wong ( 1998 ) suggest that discretionary current accruals of issuers are 
higher than those of performance-matched firms in the offer year, whereas the issuers' 
discretionary current accruals decline by more than those of their matches for each of 
the three subsequent years. 
Only three studies are related to the potential association between the reliability 
of earnings forecasts and earnings management in the previous research. One study 
was conducted by Ferris ( 1976 ) to examine managerial behavior subsequent to IPO 
forecast disclosure in UK, however, no evidence indicated that accounting 
adjustments were used by managers to reduce forecast deviations. Another study 
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focuses on the relationship between the forecast accuracy of non-IPO forecasts and 
the discretionary accounting changes in US ( Jaggi and Sannella 1995 ), and their 
findings demonstrated that there was a significant association between forecast 
reliability and earnings management. A recent study ( Kasznik 1999 ) provides 
evidence consistent with the prediction that managers of US firms use positive 
discretionary accruals to manage reported earnings upward when earnings would 
otherwise fall below non-IPO earnings forecasts. 
3. Institutional background 
Over the past two decades, China has experienced rapid economic growth 
characterized by economic reforms and the "open door" policy. A more recent but 
highly visible aspect of the economic reform program in China has been the 
development of capital markets to develop alternatives to bank financing. Since the 
late 1980s, the Chinese government has allowed Chinese enterprises to raise capital in 
the capital markets. This policy has been facilitated both by developing the securities 
markets in China as well as listing Chinese companies on international stock 
exchanges. The first official stock exchange in China opened in Shanghai in 
December 1990 followed by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in April 1991. Three 
types of shares are currently issued by Chinese companies: A-shares, which are only 
denominated in Renminbi and held only by Chinese nationals; B-shares, which are 
denominated in US dollars in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong Kong dollars in 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and intended for foreign investors only; the shares 
listed on foreign exchanges, which include H shares listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange and N shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange, all being issued to 
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foreign investors. 
Since the early 1990s, the emerging stock markets in China have expanded 
rapidly. The total number of listed companies on domestic stock exchanges has 
increased to 745 at the end of 1997 from only 14 in 1991. These 745 listed companies 
consist of 627 firms, which only issue A shares; 25 firms, which only issue B shares; 
76 firms, which issue both A and B shares; and 17 firms, which issue both A and H 
shares. The distribution of industry membership among these firms includes 61.2 
percent in manufacturing, 11.5 percent in commerce and retailing, 3.6 percent in 
property and real estate, 7.5 percent in utilities, and 16.1 percent in conglomerate. By 
the end of 1997, the total share capital of listed companies in China has reached RMB 
177.1 billion yuan, with the total market capitalization of RMB 1752.9 billion yuan 
which has tremendously increased from only 10.9 billion yuan in 1991. The total 
market capitalization of all Chinese listed companies at the end of 1997 has arrived at 
23.44 percent of China's GDP in 1997, and this demonstrates that capital markets 
have played an important role in the China's economy ( China Securities Association 
1998). 
In 1992, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was 
established under the State Council. The basic framework for information disclosure 
in the Chinese securities markets has been established by the CSRC and other 
relevant authorities. The disclosure requirements vary from securities legislation to 
detailed explanations of specific issues, and can be classified into four levels of 
requirements ( Tang, Chow and Cooper 1996 ). The first level of disclosure 
requirements relates to the securities trading legislation. The Interim Reflation on 
Administering the Issuance and Trading of Shares ( the Interim Regulation ) 
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promulgated by the State Council serves as securities legislation before the Securities 
Law drafted by the Finance and Economic Committee of the National People's 
Congress becomes effective. The Interim Regulation stipulates the disclosure 
requirements for financial reports. The second level of disclosure requirements deals 
with the detailed rules and regulations for implementing securities legislation. The 
CSRC promulgated immediately the Implementing Regulations on the Information 
Disclosure of Listed Companies after the Interim Regulation was promulgated by the 
State Council. The responsibility and obligation of listed companies for information 
disclosure, the contents of disclosure, the disclosure procedures and deadlines, and the 
period of effectiveness are regulated. 
The third level of disclosure requirements involves the content, form and 
criteria of disclosure. The CSRC has published several disclosure standards, which 
deal with the form and content of prospectuses, annual reports, interim reports, 
announcement of right offering, and legal opinions. The fourth level of disclosure 
requirements addresses the interpretation and explanation of those specific provisions 
in the laws and regulations relating to the disclosure of information, and the 
clarification of some issues relating to the implementation of disclosure requirements. 
From the perspective of listed companies, the requirements mentioned above can be 
classified into the three categories, namely initial disclosure, regular disclosure and ad 
hoc disclosure. The initial disclosure relates to IPO prospectuses and listing reports, 
and the regular disclosure relates to annual and interim reports. The ad hoc disclosure 
involves announcement of significant events, reports on intended take-over, and 
announcement of rights offering. 
The prospectuses of initial public offerings in China should disclose the 
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information such as audited financial statements for the past three years, the 
certificate of capital verification, earnings forecasts and asset appraisal, and so on. 
The main items disclosed in Chinese IPO prospectuses include: 
1. issuing price of shares; 
2. amount of capital to be raised; 
3. total amount of share capital; 
4. intended application of the capital raised; 
5. certificate of capital verification; 
6. parties related to the new issues; 
7. risk and strategy; 
8. dividend policy; 
9. underwriting, 
10. company's background; 
11. directors, members of supervisory board, and senior executives; 
12. operational performance; 
13. main items of fixed assets; 
14. report of asset appraisal; 
15. financial information; 
16. earnings forecast; 
17. commitments and litigation; 
18. development plan. 
Before a prospectus is disclosed to the public, it must be approved by the CSRC The 
summary of IPO prospectuses should be published, two to five days before the 
shares are underwritten, in any newspaper recognized by the CSRC and filed with the 
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company's headquarters, its underwriters, the securities exchange on which it is to be 
listed, and all securities firms for public reference. 
Management earnings forecasts are required to disclose in prospectuses of 
initial public offerings in China. In this context of mandatory disclosure, the extent of 
disclosure information varies across the time. The detailed information of the 
forecasted income statement for the issue year has been disclosed in Chinese IPO 
prospectuses since 1996, whereas relatively less information on earnings forecasts 
was contained in prospectuses of initial public offerings before then. The CSRC 
promulgated the Announcement of Some Rules on the Issuance of Shares in 1996, 
which prescribed some treatments unfavorable to the significant overestimation of 
IPO earnings forecasts. According to the announcement, EPO firms and their auditors 
should explain and apologize to the public in any newspaper recognized by the CSRC 
if predicted profits are estimated over actual profits by the degree of 10 to 20 percent. 
IPO firms may be penalized if earnings forecasts are overestimated above 20 percent 
and are verified to be a fraud to mislead investors by the CSRC In addition, their 
auditors must be penalized if an inadequate auditing opinion is issued in their auditing 
reports on IPO earnings forecasts. An alternative rule to mitigate forecast 
overestimation in the announcement is to prohibit the use of earnings forecasts for the 
issue year in the calculation of issuing price. The average amount of past three years' 
earnings before IPO is allowed to fix the offer price. However, earnings forecasts are 
also used to estimate the offer price for almost all IPOs going public in 1996. In 
addition, many IPO firms still ignore the seriousness of overestimation of IPO 
earnings forecasts in 1996. Therefore, 8 firms including Zhongyan Tango, Kaidi Silk, 
Lanlia Chenxiang, Shijiazhuang Quanye, Wuhan Twin-Tigers, Guhan Group, Huaya 
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Paper, and Northeast Pharmaceutical were publicly denounced by the CSRC in 1997 
because of the significant overestimation of earnings forecasts in their IPO 
prospectuses. For example, Zhongyan Tango disclosed its earnings forecast of RMB 
49.97 million yuan in the prospectus, but the reported earnings for 1996 is only 12.3 
million yuan. The revenue and operating cost of the firm for the first quarter of 1996 
are reported to be 13.9 million yuan and 2.83 million yuan in its prospectus, resulting 
in a higher rate of gross profit, namely, 80%, which is tremendously greater than 20%, 
the average rate of gross profit for 1993 and 1994. Furthermore, the firm recognized 
in the prospectus that its industry risk was very higher. In fact, it is very difficult for 
the firm to achieve an extremely higher rate of gross profit. Therefore, earnings 
forecast disclosed in its prospectus is intentionally greatly overestimated by the firm. 
Except for these listed companies, three accounting firms were also penalized by the 
CSRC for their misleading and fraud in auditing earnings forecasts. Specifically, the 
CSRC gave a disciplinary warning and economic penalty to Shenyang Public 
Accountants, whereas Beijing Public Accountants and Shijiazhuang Public 
Accountants were publicly denounced. 
4. Bias and accuracy of earnings forecasts 
In this section, I want to examine the reliability of earnings forecasts disclosed 
in IPO prospectuses in China. The forecast accuracy in China is to be compared with 
that in several British Commonwealth countries. The effects of a new IPO regulation 
on the reliability of earnings forecasts will be examined in this section. 
The sample consists of both Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange IPOs that satisfied the following criteria: 
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1. IPO prospectuses were issued during the period from 1991 to 1997; 
2. IPO prospectuses can be reviewed based on the CD-ROM, China Securities 
Information Library ( 1998 ), published by Beijing Jida Science and Trading 
Company and China People's University Publishing House jointly; 
3. The information on earnings forecasts for the IPO year is available in the 
prospectuses; 
, 4 . Firms that issued only a forecast of net income rather than a forecast of profit 
before tax were excluded from the sample;^ 
5. Firms were excluded from the sample if actual profits were not available from 
the Taiwan Economic Journal Data Base or China Securities Information 
Library CD-ROM. 
These criteria yield a sample of 503 observations.^ Of these, 175 and 170 firms were 
going public in 1997 and 1996 respectively, and 158 IPOs were floated over the 
period between 1991 and 1995. The sample is composed of 300 firms from 
manufacturing, 61 firms from commerce and retailing, 10 firms from property and 
real estate, 29 firms from utilities, and 100 firms from conglomerate. 
The reliability of earnings forecasts can be decomposed into bias and accuracy 
components. The forecast bias is measured by the signed relative forecast error 
(SRFE ), which is calculated by the following formula: 
SRFE = ( A - F ) / I F 
where, 
F = Forecast profits for the issue year, 
A = Actual profits for the issue year. 
The positive sign of signed relative forecast error indicates that actual earnings are 
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higher than forecast earnings, and earnings forecasts are underestimated. On the other 
hand, the negative sign of SRFE indicates that actual earnings are lower than forecast 
earnings, and earnings forecasts are overestimated. The number of positive or 
negative SRFE and its average may show whether managers have systematically 
over- or underestimated earnings forecasts. However, the average of SRFE can not 
provide accuracy information on the average size of the error because negative and 
positive errors cancel each other out. Therefore, in order to determine accuracy of 
forecasts on an average basis, the relative forecast error ( RFE ) is considered as a 
measure of forecast accuracy, and it is calculated as follows: 
RFE = I A - F I / I F . 
The distributions of signed relative forecast error and relative forecast error for 
the full sample of 503 IPO earnings forecasts are shown in Table 1. Of these, 227 
forecasts, 45.13 percent of the sample, are overestimated, whereas 276 forecasts, 
54.87 percent, are underestimated. There seems to be a fairly uniform distribution 
between over- and underestimated earnings forecasts for this sample of IPOs. 51.09 
percent of forecasts in the sample are clustered within positive or negative 10 percent 
of actual earnings compared with 8 percent of the Australian forecasts ( Hartnett 
1993) and 45.97 percent of the Malaysian forecasts ( Jelic, Saadouni and Briston 
1998), and 71.37 percent of the Chinese forecasts are clustered within positive or 
negative 20 percent of actual earnings compared with 55 percent of the 
Canadian forecasts ( Pedwell, Warsame and Neu 1994 ) and 19 percent of the New 
Zealand forecasts ( Firth and Smith 1992 ). 53 percent of signed relative forecast 
errors for the above Australian sample exceeded the positive or negative 100 percent, 
,however, only 0.8 percent of signed relative forecast errors for the Chinese sample is 
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not within the range between positive and negative 100 percent. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of forecast bias and accuracy for 
these 503 IPO earnings forecasts in China. The mean forecast bias and accuracy of 
the full sample are 2 percent and 17.7 percent respectively. The relative frequency of 
forecast overestimation decreased from 57.06 percent in 1996 to 37.71 percent in 
1997, whereas the mean and median of forecast bias increased from -3.54 percent and 
-3.79 percent in 1996 to 7.77 percent and 4 percent in 1997. However, the mean and 
median of forecast accuracy are 17.88 percent and 9.93 percent respectively in 1996, 
and 18.64 percent and 9.75 percent in 1997, suggesting little difference in forecast 
accuracy between 1996 and 1997. In prior studies, the mean RFE of the UK forecasts 
(Keasey and McGuiness 1991 ) and the Singapore forecasts ( Firth, Kwok, Liau-Tan 
and Yeo 1995 ) was 11 percent and 10.4 percent respectively, which is relatively 
smaller in comparison with the Chinese mean forecast accuracy. The mean ARFE for 
the Australian companies ( Hartnett 1993 ), the New Zealand companies ( Mak 
1989 )，and the Canadian companies ( Pedwell, Warsame and Neu 1994 ) was 289 
percent, 100 percent, and 88 percent respectively, indicating that they are significantly 
greater than that of the Chinese companies. The mean RFE of the Malaysian IPO 
forecasts ( Mohamad, Nassir, Kuing and Ariff 1994 ) and the Hong Kong IPO 
forecasts ( Chan, Sit, Tong, Wong and Chan 1996 ) was 27.91 percent and 18 percent 
respectively, which is also larger relative to the mean RFE for Chinese IPOs 
Therefore, on the basis of reported results in the literature, the forecast accuracy of 
Chinese IPO earnings forecasts is significantly better than that of Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada, and slight better than that of Malaysia and closer to that of Hong 
Kong. However, it is slightly worse relative to the forecast accuracy of UK and 
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Singapore. Overall, Chinese IPO earnings forecasts are not very inaccurate compared 
to the reported results of other countries. 
Because Canadian securities administrators such as the Ontario Securities 
Commission were dissatisfied with the quality of earnings forecasts, the Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants introduced an auditing guideline in 1989 that 
required earnings forecasts to be audited rather than reviewed. McConomy ( 1998 ) 
assessed the impact of this regulation on the bias and accuracy of earnings forecasts 
included in prospectuses of initial public offerings. He found that the rule change 
decreased the optimistic bias, but didn't strongly increase the accuracy of earnings 
forecasts. Also, the securities administrators in China were concerned about the 
quality of earnings forecasts disclosed in prospectuses of Chinese IPOs, and the 
CSRC promulgated, Announcement of Some Rules on the Issuance of Shares, a new 
regulation in 1996. As Table 2 shows, the rate of forecast overestimation during the 
years of 1991 to 1995 is 40.76 percent, however, the rate of 1996 significantly 
increases to 57.06 percent, suggesting that more than half of IPO earnings forecasts 
begin to be overestimated. This shift may provide a justification for the Chinese 
regulators to institute a new regulation. Obviously, the aim of the regulation is to 
control the overestimation of earnings forecasts and then to improve their reliability. 
In order to examine if the regulation achieve its goal, two hypotheses in respect 
of forecast bias and accuracy are developed as follows: 
Hypothesis 1.1: There has been no increase in signed relative forecast 
error of management earnings forecasts in prospectuses of IPOs 
following the introduction of the new regulation. 
Hypothesis 1.2: There has been no decrease in relative forecast error of 
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management earnings forecasts in prospectuses of IPOs 
following the introduction of the new regulation. 
The two hypotheses are tested by use of parametric and non-parametric methods. As 
a parametric test, Student t tests are used to compare the mean of forecast bias and 
accuracy for the samples in different periods. However, the power of t tests may be 
weakened by a high level variability in the data. The use of the Mann-Whitney U 
tests can reduce the impact of outliers on the results."^ If the hypotheses are 
statistically rejected, then the reliability of earnings forecasts is significantly affected 
by the regulation mentioned above. 
Table 2 and 3 show that the mean signed relative forecast error for the period 
of 1996 and 1997 is 2.20%, slightly but not significantly larger than that for the period 
from 1991 to 1995, namely, 1.62%. Moreover, the overestimation of IPO earnings 
forecasts is even more serious in 1996, because earnings forecasts are still prevalently 
used in the calculation of offer prices. However, the new regulation began to be 
efficacious to reduce the overestimation in 1997. The mean SRFE for 1997 is 7.77%, 
which is significantly higher than -3.54%, -1.05% and 1.62%, the mean SRFE for the 
periods of 1996, 1991 to 1996 and 1991 to 1995 respectively. Nevertheless, Table 3 
indicates that there is no significant difference in forecast accuracy between different 
periods, suggesting that the regulation can not improve forecast accuracy although it 
is efficient to mitigate forecast overestimation. 
5. Earnings management and forecast reliability 
In the literature, there are only two studies conducted by Jaggi and Sannella 
(1995 ) and Kasznik ( 1999 ) to investigate the relationship between earnings 
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management and reliability of non-IPO earnings forecasts in US. No empirical 
evidence has been presented in prior research to prove the existence of a significant 
association between the manipulation of earnings and the reliability of earnings 
forecasts contained in IPO prospectuses. The forecasts of detailed items in income 
statement began to be disclosed in almost all IPO prospectuses in China since 1996. 
This encourages me to examine whether the below-the-line items are manipulated by 
management in China to mitigate the overestimation of IPO earnings forecasts in this 
section. 
In the prior section, the full sample of 503 IPOs includes 170 IPOs in 1996 and 
175 in 1997. By deleting 6 IPOs in 1996 and 1 in 1997 from the 345 IPOs between 
1996 and 1997，which didn't disclose forecasts of income from operation in their 
prospectuses, I get the second sample of 338 observations that consist of 164 IPOs in 
1996 and 174 in 1997. Table 4 describes some statistics of the forecast bias and 
accuracy for forecasts of profit before tax and income from operation respectively. 
The relative frequency of the overestimation of forecast income from operation for the 
sample is 70 percent, whereas the relative frequency of the overestimation of forecast 
profit before tax is only 47 percent. In 1996, the rate of overforecast income from 
operation was 80 percent, significantly higher than 57 percent, the rate of overforecast 
profit before tax. Also, the percentage of overestimated forecast profit before tax was 
only 38 percent, significantly less than 60 percent, the percentage of overestimated 
forecast income from operation in 1997. The mean bias of forecast income from 
operation for the sample is -10.08 %, which is significantly less than the mean bias of 
forecast profit before tax, namely, 2.25 %. Similarly, the mean bias of forecast 
income from operation for IPOs in 1996 was -18.79 %, whereas the mean bias of 
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forecast profit before tax was -3.40 %. In addition, the mean of forecast bias for 
profit before tax was 7.63 %, significantly higher than -1.9 %，the mean of forecast 
bias for income from operation in 1997. The mean of relative forecast error for the 
sample decreased from 25.35 % for forecast income from operation to 18.12 % for 
forecast profit before tax, and also the forecast accuracy of profit before tax was 
higher than that of income from operation in 1996 and 1997 respectively. Generally, 
the overestimation bias is tremendously lower for forecast profit before tax than for 
forecast income from operation, and the forecast accuracy is significantly higher for 
profit before tax than for income from operation. 
Two types of transactions relating to income/loss from short- and long-term 
investment, and non-operating items such as asset sales and subsidy income, are 
required to be disclosed below the operating income ( income from operation ) as a 
separate line item in Chinese income statements. In previous studies, managers are 
found to manipulate the timing and magnitude of transactions involving investment 
securities and asset sales for their incentives. For example, Bartov ( 1993 ) 
empirically examined whether managers manipulated earnings through the timing of 
income recognition from disposal of long-lived assets and investments. His findings 
are consistent with the timing of asset sales by managers so that the recognized 
income from these sales smooths interporal earnings changes and mitigates 
accounting-based restrictions in bond covenants. The study conducted by Beatty, 
Chamberlain and Magliolo ( 1995 ) suggests that both pension settlement gains and 
gains from miscellaneous asset sales can be used to manage earnings. Black, Sellers 
and Manly ( 1998 ) found that asset sales were used to smooth income in UK, 
�Austra l ia and New Zealand. Especially, Haw, Qi, Wu and Zhang ( 1998 ) presented 
21 
the evidence that managers manipulated transactions involving below-the-line items 
to meet regulatory ROE targets for stock rights offering and / or to reduce the 
probability of suspension and termination of the listing in China. 
Managers are motivated to reduce forecast errors and to improve forecast 
accuracy because significant forecast errors may lead to a loss of company and 
management reputation, a loss of confidence and credibility in the firm, an adverse 
market reaction, and a potential litigation. Lees ( 1981 ) reports survey evidence 
reflecting managers' concern that inaccurate forecasts give the appearance of 
instability, leading to a perception by investors that the firm is high risk and to a lower 
share price. Jaggi and Sannella ( 1995 ) note that the underlying rationale for 
improving forecast accuracy is to ensure that the forecast represents a reliable source 
of market information to be used to developing future earnings and cash flow 
expectation, and to help managers reduce the potential penalty resulting from high 
forecast errors. Kasznik ( 1999) suggests that a wish to avoid potential legal liability 
and loss of reputation provides the incentive for managers who issue an earnings 
forecast that later becomes inaccurate to manage reported earnings toward the 
forecast. Managers will make income-increasing ( decreasing ) accounting decisions 
when they expect earnings might fall below ( above ) their previously disclosed 
forecasts. The magnitude of the earnings management is increasing in expected 
forecast error costs. Managers may be more motivated to increase the reported 
earnings when actual earnings are expected to be lower than predicted earnings than 
to increase or decrease the reported earnings when actual earnings are expected to be 
higher than predicted earnings. 
In China, predicted earnings are traditionally viewed as an important part of 
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planned tasks that firms and their mangers should complete. The result of whether 
reported earnings are higher than predicted earnings or not may be used to measure 
the performance of firms and their managers, and therefore affect the market values of 
firms and the job security of managers. The introduction of the new regulation 
increases the cost of IPO earnings forecast errors. Firms and their auditors are more 
likely to be punished than before if earnings are significantly overestimated. 
Managers may have an incentive to optimistically forecast earnings for a higher IPO 
price, however, they have to avoid significant overestimation because of the costs of 
forecast errors. An intended idea for managers may be to optimistically estimate 
earnings when IPOs are issued and then to manage earnings to mitigate forecast errors 
when actual earnings are reported. Do Chinese managers have this idea? I think that 
it is very likely. Table 4 shows that forecasts of operating income are 
overwhelmingly overestimated, but forecasts of profit before tax are toward 
underestimation, suggesting that managers may manipulate the below-the-line items 
to reduce forecast overestimation. In order to examine whether mangers manipulate 
the below-the-line items to reduce forecast errors, a hypothesis is formulated as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 2.1: Managers in China are motivated to manipulate transactions 
involving the below-the-line items to reduce the overestimation of 
IPO earning forecasts. 
Firstly, the study is to determine the measure of unexpected effect of the 
below-the-line items on actual signed relative forecast error ( SRFE ). Naturally, the 
predicted amount of the below-the-line items disclosed in the income statements of 
forecast is used as a better proxy for the normal or expected amount of these items, 
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because it is the real amount that firms expected when earnings forecasts were issued. 
Therefore, the unexpected amount of the below-the-line items is defined as the 
unusual amount of these items by separating the normal or expected amount. The 
unexpected effect of the below-the-line items on relative forecast error is measured as 
the realized amount of these items less than their expected amount, deflated by the 
earnings forecasts. Thus, the signed relative forecast error adjusted for the below-the-
Hne items (SRFE*) can be calculated by deleting the unexpected effect of these items. 
Table 5 provides the distributions of actual signed relative forecast error 
(SRFE) and signed relative forecast error adjusted for the below-the-line items 
(SRFE*). These distributions are also presented intuitively in Figure 1. As mentioned 
before, the introduction of the new regulation increases the risk of forecast 
overestimation. The more the forecast is overestimated, the more likely the firms and 
their auditors are penalized. Therefore, managers have an incentive to avoid 
significant overestimation. In Table 5 and Figure 1, the relative frequency of SRFE 
increases significantly from 3.5% for the interval just before a critical level of 
overestimation, -20%, given in the new regulation, to 12.4% for the interval just after 
the critical level. Similarly, the relative frequency of SRFE increases sharply from 
12.40/0 to 25.4% for the interval just before and after another critical level of 
overestimation, -10%. These sharp upward change in the frequency of sRFE around 
the two critical levels reflects a tendency to avoid significant overestimation. 
Additionally, the line representing the relative frequency of negative signed relative 
forecast error (SRFE) is consistently below the line representing the relative 
frequency of negative signed relative forecast error adjusted for the below-the-line 
items (SRFE*) in Figure 1. However, the relative frequency of RFE between 0 and 
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10% is 26%, sharply larger than that of RFE*, suggesting that the below-the-line 
items are used to reduce the possibility of overestimation. Moreover, the relative 
frequency of SRFE in the interval between 10% and 20% is only 7.4%, which 
significantly decreases from 26%, the relative frequency of RFE in the preceding 
interval. The significant downward shift shows that managers begin to be less 
motivated to increase RFE when earnings forecasts are underestimated. 
, Figure 2 presents the scatter graph of the signed relative forecast error adjusted 
for the below-the-line items (SRFE*) and the unexpected effect of these items on 
forecast errors (UE). The shape of the scatter intuitively reflects a negative 
relationship between RFE* and UE. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient between 
these two variables is -36.4%, which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (two-
tailed). The significant negative association between SRFE* and UE suggests that the 
greater the earnings prior to the below-the-line items are overestimated, the larger 
unexpected amount of these items are motivated to be adopted. 
In order to provide more detail evidences, the study will examine whether 
managers employ the below-the-line items to avoid the critical levels of forecast 
errors. The firms are classified into four groups for a particular level of -20%, -10% 
and zero. The first group consists of the firms with a signed relative forecast error of 
more than the critical level and a signed relative forecast error adjusted for the below-
the-line items of less than the critical level. The firms in the first group can 
successfully avoid the critical level of overestimation after executing transactions 
involving the below-the-line items. The second, third and fourth group include the 
firms whose signed relative forecast errors are more than, less than and less than the 
critical level respectively, and whose signed relative forecast errors adjusted for the 
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below-the-line items are more than, less than and more than the critical level 
respectively. The first, second, third and fourth group for a critical level of -20% is 
denoted as Gn, G12，G13 and Gm respectively. G21, G22, G23 and G24 denote the four 
groups orderly for a critical level of - 1 0 % . For the critical level of zero, G31, G32, G33 
and G34 are assigned to the four groups respectively. 
ANOVA is used to examine if manages manipulate the below-the-line items to 
avoid the critical level of overestimation. Table 6 presents the results of ANOVA for 
the critical level of-20%. 68% of the firms with a signed relative forecast error before 
the below-the-line items (SRFE*) of less than -20% can successfully avoid the 
critical level of overestimation, whereas 32% of these firms can not avoid the level. 
99% of the firms with a SRFE* of more than -20% still have a SRFE of more than -
20%, but only 1% of the firms have a level of less than -20% after the below-the-line 
items. The firms that can successfully avoid the critical level of -20% have the 
average unexpected effect (UE) of 32%, which is significantly higher than 8%, 11% 
and -24.6% respectively in G12, G13 and Gm. The ANOVA results for the critical 
level o f - 1 0 % are provided in Table 7. 55% of the firm with a SRFE* below -10% 
can avoid the critical level after the below-the-line items, but 45% of the firms can not 
avoid it. 97% of the firms with a SRFE* above -10% still remain the status of more 
than the level, whereas only 3% of these firms change it. 26.4%, the average level of 
unexpected effect for the firms that can avoid the critical level , is also significantly 
higher than 7.4%, 11.5% and - 1 2 . 6 % for G22, G23 and G24 respectively. Additionally, 
Table 8 shows that the percentage of firm that can avoid the critical level of zero is 
reduced to 34% because the cost of overestimation for the level is relatively lower. 
However, the average unexpected effect of firms in G31 is still significantly larger 
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than that in other groups. Generally, managers are more motivated to avoid the 
critical level of overestimation if the cost of overestimation for the level is higher. 
Managers can use higher unexpected effect of the below-the-line items on reported 
earnings to avoid the critical level of overestimation. 
Regression analysis is also employed to support the evidence given by 
ANOVA and further examine if there is a significant difference in the effect of the 
new regulation on managers' manipulation of the below-the-line items to avoid the 
overestimation of forecast between 1996 and 1997. The regression model is 
developed as follows: 
UE = a + p] AVOIDER + P2 AVOIDER*Y + p3 Y + s ( 1 ) 
where, 
UE = unexpected effect of the below-the-line items on reported earnings, 
AVOIDER = a dummy variable for firms that equal 1 if they can exceed the 
critical level of forecast errors from a level below it before the 
below-the-line items, and 0 otherwise, 
Y = a year dummy variable that equals 1 for 1997 and 0 for 1996, 
s = a random error term. 
In Model ( 1 ), the unexpected effect of below-the-line items ( BTL ) is calculated by 
the difference between actual BTL amount and predicted BTL amount deflated by 
the absolute value of predicted earnings.5 The introduction of the regulation in 1996 
has increased the cost of overestimation. The variable, AVOIDER, is intended to test 
if managers execute transactions involving the below-the-line items to avoid the 
potential penalty and other costs of forecast errors. The coefficient for AVOIDER is 
expected to be positively significant if the hypothesis is supported. The year dummy 
,variable ( Y ) is used to control for the change in general economic conditions across 
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years. However, many firms did not mitigate their ex-ante managerial behavior of 
estimating earnings optimistically in IPO prospectuses in 1996, resulting in the 
serious penalty of eight listed companies and three audit firms by CSRC in 1997. The 
penalty beginning in 1997 changed the ex-ante managerial behavior to less 
optimistically predict earnings. Thus, the sharp reduction in overestimation in 1997 
may not be due to the significant difference in the effect of the new regulation on 
managerial manipulation of the below-the-line items to avoid significant 
overestimation. The interaction variable between AVOIDER and Y is added to 
examine if the effect of the new regulation on the manipulation of the below-the-line 
items is higher in 1997 than in 1996. 
Table 9 presents the results of regression analysis for three different critical 
levels, -20%, -10% and 0 respectively. For the critical level of -20%, the coefficient 
on AVOIDER is 22.9%, which is significantly positive. The coefficients of 
AVOIDER for the critical level of -10% and 0, namely, 17.7% and 15.8% 
respectively, are also significant, but lower than that for the critical level of -20%. 
The positively significant association between the unexpected effect of the below-the-
line items and the variable of AVOIDER suggests that managers are motivated to 
manipulate transactions of these items to avoid the critical level of overestimation. 
The coefficients of the interaction variable for the three levels are positive, but are not 
significant. The insignificant relationship between the unexpected effect and the 
interaction variable shows that the sharp reduction of overestimation in 1997 can not 
be possibly due to the increasing effect of the new regulation on the manipulation of 
the below-the-line items in 1997 relative to 1996. Therefore, the ex-ante managerial 
behavior in 1997 may be changed to less optimistically estimate earnings because of 
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the penalty. The significant reduction of overestimation in 1997 may be due to the 
effect of the new regulation on the ex-ante managerial behavior of estimating earnings 
optimistically in IPO prospectuses. 
6. Determinants of forecast accuracy 
Most of the previous studies on the reliability of IPO earnings forecasts 
involved the determinants of forecast accuracy. The firm characteristics influence 
forecast accuracy differently across various countries, and the determinants in one 
context can't be generalized in another context. In this section, possible factors that 
affect forecast accuracy in China will be examined. 
The size of firms is always considered a potential determinant of forecast 
accuracy. Hagerman and Ruland ( 1979 ) suggest that larger firms are more 
diversified and are thus better able to weather the effects of changing environmental 
conditions and, consequently, can produce more accurate forecasts than smaller firms. 
Cox ( 1985 ) argues that larger firms have both the human resources to prepare a 
higher-quality forecast and a more predictable earnings process that makes accurate 
forecast possible. Managers of larger firms have an incentive to provide more 
accurate forecasts because larger firms have a larger flow of external information 
sources ( Cox 1987 ), which serve as monitoring mechanisms. Furthermore, larger 
firms may have greater control over their market settings, and may have some 
comparative economies of scale which make them less susceptible to economic 
fluctuations ( Firth and Smith 1992 )• The empirical evidence that larger firms have a 
higher accuracy of IPO earnings forecasts was found in the contexts of Canada 
(Davison and Neu 1993 ) and Singapore ( Firth, Kwok, Liau-Tan and Yeo 1995 ). 
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However, Firth and Smith ( 1992 ) reported that larger firms provided less accurate 
forecasts than smaller firms in New Zealand. One possible explanation is that larger 
firms raise proportionately more capital in the new issue, and it is more difficult to 
forecast earnings from the investment of larger proceeds ( Berlinger and Robbins 
1986 )• Another potential explanation given by Herbig, Milewicz and Golden ( 1993 ) 
notes that the corporate bureaucracy and the firm's massive size could hinder its 
efficiency and forecasting effectiveness. Additionally, Chan, Sit, Tong, Wong and 
Chan ( 1996 ) suggest that accuracy may be more important in an absolute sense to 
the management of smaller firms because the market may be more tolerant of error on 
the part of larger firms. Despite the opposite evidences, the traditional hypothesis is 
set as follows: 
Hypothesis 3.1: The larger the firm size, the lower the forecast error. 
It has been argued that an important factor affecting forecast accuracy is the 
time horizon of forecasts. A positive association between the length of forecast 
horizon and the forecast error was reported in earlier research ( Collins and Hopwood 
1980; Brown, Foster and Noreen 1985 ). Forecasting is an inherently uncertain 
process and the longer the forecast horizon, the greater the possibility that unexpected 
events will affect the object of the forecast. Moreover, forecasts made closer to the 
end of the forecast period will have a better set of information on which the forecasts 
are based. Previous studies have found that there is a positively significant 
relationship between the error of IPO earnings forecasts and the forecast horizon in 
the contexts of New Zealand ( Mak 1989 )’ UK ( Keasey and McGuinness 1991 )’ 
Australia ( Hartnett 1993 ), Canada ( Davidson and Neu 1993 ), and Singapore ( Firth, 
Kwok, Liau-Tan and Yeo 1995 ). However, no evidence that IPO forecast horizon is 
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significantly related to forecast error was found in Hong Kong ( Chan, Sit, Tong, 
Wong and Chan 1996; Jaggi 1997 ) and Malaysia ( Mohamad, Nassir, Kuing and 
Ariff 1994; Jelic, Saadouni and Brison 1998 ). A possible reason for the lack of a 
significant relationship is that the shorter the horizon, the less time managers have to 
employ the new issue proceeds and generate earnings from them ( Firth and Smith 
1992 ). Furthermore, Ferris and Hayes ( 1977 ) found that forecast error was 
negatively associated with forecast horizon. They conjectured that if the forecast 
horizon is longer, managers may have a greater opportunity to excise discretion in the 
maintenance and capital expenditure decisions which would result in bringing the 
actual earnings closer toward forecasts. Notwithstanding the different arguments, the 
hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 3.2: The shorter the forecast horizon, the lower the forecast 
error. 
Another potential determinant of forecast accuracy is the past earnings 
variability, which is reported to be negatively related to forecast accuracy in a study 
conducted by Porter ( 1982 ). It is argued that past earnings data are always used as 
inputs to the forecasting process, and quantitative forecasting models use information 
on past earnings to predict future earnings. Therefore, it may be more difficult to 
forecast earnings if past data show a large variation across different years. Moreover, 
the performance of a company may be very sensitive to some factors such as local and 
global market conditions, interest rate movements, exchange rate movements, and 
changes in taste of customers, etc. The effects of these factors on the firm's future 
performance may be incorporated in the past earnings variability ( Eddy and Seifert 
, 1 9 9 2 ). The variability of a firm's earnings stream in the period prior to the forecast 
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would be a better proxy for the ex ante risk of the firm. As the level of firm-specific 
risk increases, greater uncertainty can be attached to the forecasting process. It is 
expected that the firm-specific risk will be positively associated with the forecast 
error. Naturally, the following hypothesis is developed: 
Hypothesis 3 .3: The higher the past earnings variability, the higher the 
forecast error. 
, The financial leverage of a firm may be a possible explanatory variable for 
forecast accuracy. Eddy and Seifert ( 1992 ) note that the existence of higher leverage 
makes earnings forecasting more difficult because higher financial leverage of a firm 
causes greater variability in its earnings. The firm with a greater financial leverage 
may be affected by deteriorating economic conditions more seriously. The higher the 
financial leverage, the higher the risk faced by the firm. It has been argued that firms 
with relatively high debt levels are likely to experience more volatile earnings. For 
example, Francis, Philbrick and Schipper ( 1998 ) present the evidence that even a 
modest decline in sales relative to management's expectations has the potential to 
create a large earnings shortfall for a firm with high financial leverage. Thus, the 
firms of higher financial leverage may not be able to make more accurate forecasts 
than the firms of lower financial leverage. The relationship between the financial 
leverage and the forecast accuracy is tested upon the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3.4: The higher the financial leverage, the higher the 
forecast error. 
In China, earnings forecasts disclosed in IPO prospectuses are required to be 
audited by public accountants, and auditors are involved in the making of earnings 
forecasts. Simunic and Stein ( 1987 ) have argued that Big Five accounting firms are 
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the producers of high quality audits. High quality accounting firms have a strong 
incentive to provide high quality services (i.e. more accurate information disclosures ) 
in order to maintain their investment in reputational capital and investor's perceptions 
of their expertise ( DeAngelo 1981; Healy and Lys 1986 ). Therefore, it is suggested 
that the auditor reputation is negatively related to the forecast error. However, no 
evidence so far shows the existence of a significant association mentioned above. On 
the other hand, a different argument is that management may have fewer opportunities 
to manipulate reported earnings for the reduction of forecast errors when a high 
quality auditor is present, resulting in a positive association between the auditor 
quality and the forecast error. Davidson and Neu ( 1993 ) found the empirical 
evidence that there was a positively significant relationship between public accountant 
quality and forecast errors. The traditional hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 3.5: The higher the quality of the firm ’s auditor, the lower 
the forecast error. 
The retention ownership may also affect the forecast accuracy of IPO earnings 
forecasts. Keasey and McGuinness ( 1991 ) suggest that a lower level of equity 
retention may indicate that IPO earnings forecasts have been inflated in order to 
maximize the issue proceeds. Furthermore, the entrepreneur who retains less equity 
may be less concerned with adverse reputation effects on the firm. In addition, the 
financial results of a firm with a higher retention of equity may have less variation 
relative to a firm with a lower level because a firm with a higher level of retained 
equity may be relatively less affected by the increase of its scale. Therefore, an 
inverse relationship may exist between the level of ownership retention and the 
, f o r e c a s t error. 
Hypothesis 3.6: The higher the rate of retention ownership, the lower the 
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forecast error. 
In order to test these six hypotheses, the following regression model is 
developed: 
RFE=a+piS+p2FH+p3PEV+p4FL+P5Q+P6RRO+p7li+p8l2+[39l3+Piol4+8 ( 2 ) 
where, 
ARFE = absolute relative forecast error, 
• S = size of a firm, 
FH = time horizon of a forecast, 
PEV = variability of past earnings, 
FL = financial leverage of a firm, 
Q = quality of an auditor, 
RRO = the rate of retention ownership, 
I j = industry membership of a firm ( j = l ,2 , 3, 4). 
In Model ( 2 ), the log value of total assets at the end of the issue year is used as a 
proxy for the firm size. The forecast horizon is measured in terms of the 
number of months between the prospectus date and the end of the issue year. The 
past earnings variability is calculated by dividing the standard deviation of earnings 
across three years before the issue year by the mean of the three years' earnings. The 
financial leverage is measured by the total liabilities over the total assets at the end of 
the issue year. The quality of an auditor is defined as 1 if the auditor is a Big Five 
firm or 0 otherwise. The rate of retention ownership is the percentage of the total 
equity retained by existing owners after IPO. I j is assigned to 1 if the firm belongs to 
industry j or 0 otherwise, and industry 1, 2, 3, 4 denotes manufacturing, retail, 
,utili t ies, and conglomerate respectively. The expected signs of coefficients for FH, 
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PEV, and FL are positive, whereas the coefficients of S, Q and RRO are expected to 
be negative. I j is used to control for the possible difference in forecast accuracy 
across different industries. 
Table 10 provides some descriptive statistics of the continuous independent 
variables in Model ( 2 ). No higher correlations between these variables are found in 
Table 11，suggesting that there is no collinearity problem weakening the significance 
of the relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables. Table 
12 presents the evidences on the determinants of IPO forecast accuracy in China. 
Three firm characteristics such as forecast horizon, past earnings variability and rate 
of retained ownership can significantly affect the accuracy of IPO earnings forecasts. 
Specifically, the longer the time horizon between date of forecast disclosure and the 
end of the fiscal year for initial public offerings, the more accurate the IPO earnings 
forecasts. The firms with less variation in past years' earnings before IPO are more 
likely to provide more accurate forecasts. Additionally, firms can accurately predict 
their earnings if they retain a higher proportionate level of ownership. However, the 
financial leverage of firms can not significantly influence the forecast accuracy 
although its positive association is consistent with the prediction. Moreover, the larger 
firms can not make more accurate earnings forecasts because they may raise so larger 
capital that it is difficult to accurately predict earnings from the investment of larger 
proceeds. The firm's auditor quality is positively related to the forecast errors, which 
is also contrary to the prediction. Finally, no evidence is found that there is a 
significant difference in forecast accuracy across various industries. 
� 7 . Conclusions and implications 
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In the early 1970s the Securities and Exchange Commission changed its long-
held position prohibiting the release of forecasted financial information in any 
prospectus or report filed with it, however, the inclusion of earnings forecasts in IPO 
prospectuses is almost nonexistent in US because of its high-litigation environment. 
Therefore, US accounting researchers have to leave this topic to their counterparts of 
other countries, and this encourages academicians to investigate IPO earnings 
forecasts in other contexts. Previous studies on this topic are mainly conducted using 
the data from the British Commonwealth countries, and the results differentiate 
among these contexts. Nevertheless, the empirical investigation of IPO earnings 
forecasts has been little addressed to the emerging capital markets. This study is a 
comprehensive investigation on the reliability of earnings forecast information 
disclosed in prospectuses of initial public offerings in China. Not only the literature 
can be enriched by the study for its use of Chinese data, but also it can provide more 
intuitive insights on Chinese IPO forecast information for researchers, investors and 
regulators. 
Being calculated by use of the data from 503 Chinese offerings issued over the 
years from 1991 to 1997 in this study, the mean relative forecast error of IPO earnings 
forecasts is 17.7 percent, which means that forecasts in China are not very accurate 
because it exceeds 10 percent, a traditional threshold level. However, the forecast 
accuracy in China is higher relative to most of the British Commonwealth countries 
although the disclosure of earnings forecasts in Chinese IPO prospectuses is 
mandatory. Generally speaking, the Chinese IPO forecast reliability is not very 
incredible, and can be acceptable. The evidence suggests that the reliability of 
, e a r n i n g s forecasts in a context can not be dominantly determined by the nature of its 
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disclosure environment, namely, voluntary or mandatory disclosure. The findings 
may mitigate the concerns of Chinese securities regulators on the reliability of 
earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses. 
The Announcement of Some Rules on the Issuance of Shares promulgated by 
the CSRC was introduced in 1996. According to this regulation, IPO firms and their 
auditors would be apologized or penalized if significant forecast overestimation is 
present, therefore, the cost of overestimation increases after the institution of the 
regulation. On the other hand, the regulation prescribes that forecast earnings is not 
allowed to be used in the setting of offering price, which reduces the benefit of 
overestimation. A direct implication of the study is an assessment of the efficacy of 
the policy change. The preliminary evidence shows that the directional errors of 
earnings forecasts are significantly different between 1996 and 1997, whereas the 
absolute forecast error is not significantly different across different periods. The new 
regulation begins to be efficient in the reduction of overestimation in 1997 since some 
listed companies and their auditors are penalized since 1997. This study may 
demonstrate that, to the extent of the goal of the introduction of the regulation is to 
curb the overly optimistic IPO earnings forecasts, the regulation may be successful; 
but to the extent that the goal is to improve overall forecast accuracy, the regulation 
has not had the expected impact. 
Many previous studies of IPO forecast reliability in the British Commonwealth 
countries focus on the identification of possible factors that may affect the forecast 
accuracy. However, a firm characteristic can significantly influence the forecast 
accuracy in one country, but can not in another country. It is impossible to have a 
, u n i f o r m set of determinants on the forecast accuracy across different contexts. So it is 
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justified to seek potential determinants of IPO forecast accuracy in the context of 
China. Moreover, for investors, the finding that firm characteristics are associated 
with forecast accuracy supplies useful information for future investment decision-
making. The study suggests that forecast horizon and past earnings variability are 
significantly positively related to forecast errors, whereas the rate of retained 
ownership is significantly negatively associated with forecast errors. This study may 
help investors to know what types of firms are better able to provide reliable IPO 
earnings forecasts in China. 
In the literature, few studies have been conducted to examine the relationship 
between earnings management and earnings forecast reliability. Only two US studies 
(Jaggi and Sannella 1995; Kaznik 1999 ) found that managers' motive to improve 
non-IPO forecast accuracy is one of reasons of earnings management, whereas so far 
no findings suggest that managers are motivated to manipulate earnings for the 
reduction of IPO forecast errors. The descriptive statistics in the study indicate that 
forecast profits from operation overestimated significantly, but forecast profits before 
tax tend to be underestimated slightly. I find that the greater the forecast error before 
the below-the-line items, the more the managers are motivated to manipulate these 
items. Managers employ higher unexpected effect of the below-the-line items on 
reported earnings to avoid the overestimation of forecast. The study suggests that the 
ex-ante managerial behavior of Chinese IPOs is to estimate earnings overly 
optimistically, and the ex-post managerial behavior is to manage earnings to reduce 
the overestimation. The overall direction of forecast errors in China may be 
determined by the trade-off between ex-ante and ex-post managers' behaviors. 
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Notes: 
1. The forecasts of detailed items on income statements began to be disclosed in almost all 
IPO prospectuses since 1996. The predicted items such as profit before tax, operating 
income and below-the-line items, etc. are required to detect earnings management in the 
study. 
2. The income tax rate of an IPO firm is always changed after the flotation. The post-IPO rate 
is uncertain as it is given by the local tax authority. The common income tax rate for a firm 
is 33%, however, IPO firms are often preferentially assisted with a lower tax rate by their 
local governments. Moreover, the annual profit for the IPO year may be taxed on a post-
•• IPO rate for the whole year or on a pre-IPO rate for the period before IPO and on a post-
IPO rate for the rest of the year. As in most previous studies, the forecasts of profit before 
tax are used in the study to avoid the effects of post-IPO tax policy change on the forecast 
reliability. 
3. The total number of A-share firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange by the end of 1997 is 720, of which 631 firms publicly issued the 
prospectuses of initial public offering. By deleting 128 firms that issue only a forecast of 
net income or that the actual earnings for the IPO year are not available in the public 
sources, the sample consists of 503 IPO firms. 
4. This test is a non-parametnc statistical test, often referred to as the Rank Sum Test. The 
detail description of the test can be found in most statistical textbooks ( For example, 
Morris Hamburg 1991 ). ’ 
5. The predicted BTL is the aggregate amount of forecasted below-the-line items. 
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The distributions of signed relative forecast errors and relative forecast errors 
( N = 503 ) 
SRFE RFE 
Frequency Cumulative(%) Frequency Cumulative(%) 
(-00，-1] 1 0.20 
(-1,-0.5] 12 2.58 
(-0.5,-0.4] 9 4.37 
(-0.4,-0.3] 23 8.94 
(-0.3,-0.2] 11 11.13 
(-0.2,-0.1] 62 23.46 
(-0.1,-0.05] 53 34.00 
(-0.05,0] 56 45.13 
(0,0.05] 98 64.61 154 30.62 
(0.05,0.1] 50 74.55 103 51.09 
(0.1,0.2] 40 82.50 102 71.37 
(0.2,0.5] 66 95.63 109 93.04 
(0.5, 1 ] 19 99.40 31 99.20 
( 1 , + � ] 3 100 4 100 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Forecast Errors 
N Mean Median Std Dev Overestimation 
•Panel A: Signed Relative Forecast Error ( SRFE ) 
total 503 2.02% 0.63% 30.53% 45.13% 
1997 175 7.77% 4.00% 30.48% 37.71% 
1996 170 -3.54% -3.79% 26.17% 57.06% 
96-97 345 2.20% 0.76% 31.90% 47.25% 
91-95 158 1.62% 0.60% 27.22% 40.76% 
91-96 328 -1.05% 0.04% 26.76% 49.08% 
Panel B: Relative Forecast Error ( ARFE ) 
total 503 17.70% 9.89% 24.89% 
1997 175 18.64% 9.75% 31.55% 
1996 170 17.88% 9.93% 19.38% 
96-97 345 18.26% 9.89% 26.23% 
91-95 158 �6.46o/o 9.71% 21.69% 
91-96 328 17.19% 9.90% 20.51% 
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Table 1 
Test of the New Regulation's Impact on Forecast Errors 
Panel A: Impact on Forecast Bias 
t- test Mann-Whitney U test 
97-96 vs.91-95 t = 0.196 z = 0.586 
.. (/? =0.845) (p = 0.558 ) 
97 vs. 1996 t = 3.355* z = 5.174* 
= 0.001 ) (/? = 0.000) 
97 vs. 91-95 t = 1.748*** z = 3.014* 
( p = 0.081) ( p = 0.003) 
97 vs. 91-96 t = 2.859* z = 4.789* 
= 0.005 ) ( p = 0.000) 
96 vs. 91-95 t = -1.751*** z = -2.049** 
— 0 . 0 8 1 ) = 0.041 ) 
Panel B; Impact on Forecast Accuracy 
t - test Mann-Whitney U test 
97-96 vs. 91-95 t = 0.752 z = 1.445 
(p=0.452) (/7=0.149) 
97 vs. 1996 t = 0.270 z = 0.271 
= 0.787) (p = 0.786) 
97 vs. 91-95 t = 0.725 z= 1.165 
(p =0.469) (p = 0.244) 
97 vs. 91-96 t = 0.545 z = 0.497 
(/? = 0.586) ( p = 0.619) 
96 vs. 91-95 t =0.623 z = 1.356 
= 0.534 ) — 0 . 1 7 5 ) 
Notes: 
* Significant at the 1% level (two-tailed ) 
** Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed ) 
*** Significant at the 10% level (two-tailed ) 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics of SRFE and RFE (Profit Before Tax and Operating Income ) 
N Rate of Mean Mean 
Overestimation (SRFE) (RFE) 
Panel A: Profit Before Tax 
total 338 47% 2.25% 18.12% 
1996 164 57% -3.40% 17.65% 
1997 174 38% 7.63% 18.56% 
Panel B: Profit Form Operation 
total 338 70% -10.08% 25.35% 
1996 164 80% -18.79% 25.81% 
1997 174 60% -1.90% 24.92% 
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Table 1 
Distribution of actual SRFE and SRFE adjusted for the below-the-line items (SRFE*) 
SRFE Frequency Percentage SRFE* Frequency Percentage 
••<-50% 7 2.07% <-50% 26 7.69% 
-50,-40% 7 2.07% -50,-40% 13 3.85% 
-40,-30% 6 1.78% -40,-30% 20 5.92% 
-30,-20% 12 3.55% -30,-20% 35 10.35% 
-20,-10% 42 12.43% -20,-10% 55 16.27% 
-10%,0 86 25.44% -10%,0 87 25.74% 
0,10% 88 26.04% 0,10% 45 13.31% 
10,20% 25 7.40% 10,20% 25 7.40% 
20,30% 24 7.10% 20,30% 11 3.25% 
30,40% 11 3.25% 30,40% 6 1.77% 
40,50% 14 4.14% 40,50% 7 2.07% 
> 50% 16 4.73% > 50% 8 2.37% 
49 
Table 6 
ANOVA results for the critical level o f -20% 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
Gil 64 32.03% 23.78% 
Gi2 242 8.01% 14.26% 
Gi3 30 10.95% 19.76% 
Gi4 2 -24.66% 2.45% 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.211 3 1.070 37.254 .000 
Within Groups 9.595 334 0.0287 




ANOVA results for the critical level of zero 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
... 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
G21 83 26.37% 23.29% 
G22 181 7.44% 15.10% 
G23 69 11.53% 16.38% 
G24 5 -12.63% 19.49% 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Sig. 
Between Groups 2.381 3 0.794 25.424 .000 
Within Groups 10.425 334 0.0312 
Total 12.806 337 
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Table 8 
ANOVA results for the critical level of zero 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
G31 80 24.77% 25.10% 
G32 98 7.48% 12.74% 
G33 156 10.61% 15.43% 
G34 4 -25.56% 39.93% 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F Sig. 
Between Groups 2.085 3 0.695 21.657 .000 
Within Groups 10.721 334 0.0321 




Test on the Association between Forecast Errors and Unexpected Effect 
of the BTL l tems(n = 338 ) 
Model: UE = a + Pi AVOIDER + p2 AVOIDER*Y + p3 Y + e 
Expected 
Sign Coefficient t - statistic p - value 
Panel A: For the Critical Level o f -20% 
Intercept 0.085 5.577 0.000* 
AVOIDER + 0.229 7.144 0.000* 
AVOIDER*Y 0.023 0.470 0.639 
Y -0.007 -0.354 0.724 
Adjusted R^ = 22.6% F = 33.749 {p = 0.000 )* 
Panel B: For the Critical Level o f -10% 
Intercept 0.089 5.443 0.000* 
AVOIDER + 0.177 5.613 0.000* 
AVOIDER*Y 0.009 0.193 0.847 
Y -0.014 -0.628 0.531 
Adjusted R^ = 15.6% F = 21.715 (p = 0.000 )* 
Panel C: For the Critical Level of zero 
Intercept 0.100 6.120 0.000* 
AVOIDER + 0.158 4.656 0.000* 
AVOIDER*Y 0.003 0.056 0.955 
Y -0.022 -0.970 0.333 
Adjusted R^ = 11.6% F = 15.713 0 = 0.000)* 
Notes: 
* Significant at the 1% level (two-tailed ) 
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Table 10 
Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables in Model (2) 
Size Forecast Past Earnings Financial Rate of 
Horizon Variability Leverage Retained Equity 
Mean 13.27 5.97 0.37 0.40 0.68 
Median 13.22 6 0.30 0.38 0.68 
Q1 12.66 3 0.18 0.25 0.60 
Q3 13.72 8 0.49 0.49 0.75 
Standard 0.85 3.12 0.28 0.44 0.13 
Deviation 
Table 11 
Correlations of Continuous Variables in Model (2) 
Size Forecast Past Earnings Financial Rate of 
Horizon Variability Leverage Retained Equity 
Size 1 0.138 -0.170 0.073 0.264 
Forecast 
Horizon 1 -0.054 0.010 -0.068 
Past Earnings 
Variability 1 0.045 -0.002 
Financial 
Leverage 1 -0.013 
Rate of 
Retained Equity 1 
% — — ^  
54 
Table 12 
Test on the Determinants of Forecast Accuracy 




‘ Sign Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 0.014 0.639 0.523 
S - 0.005 0.338 0.735 
FH + 0.011 2.906 0.004* 
PEV + 0.104 2.471 0.014** 
FL + 0,019 0.713 0.476 
Q - 0.042 0.952 0.342 
RRO - -0.261 -2.470 0.014** 
11 0.036 0.430 0.667 
12 0.052 0.582 0.561 
13 0.050 0.524 0.601 
14 -0.004 -0.048 0.961 
Adjusted R^ = 2.9% F = 2.398 {p = 0.009 )* 
Notes: 
* Significant at the 1% level (two-tailed ) 
** Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed ) 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of SRFE and SRFE* 
L / k 
o|  
-0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Figure 2 
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